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Abstract:
This study examines how the once prestigious medical profession in 
China has become criticized to the point of inducing widespread violence 
by patients. Drawing on archival documents, media articles, interviews, 
and secondary sources, we trace the lengthy and uneven trajectory by 
which the profession moved from collective approval through 
ambivalence towards stigmatization. We develop a process model of 
professional stigmatization that identifies dynamics that precipitate and 
then catalyze that trajectory; and highlight the underpinning 
mechanisms. By unpacking the complex process of stigmatization, the 
study extends understanding of how aspects of stigma emerge, and are 
attached by different stakeholders to a profession, and the consequences 
that follow. We conclude by highlighting implications for research on 
stigma and the challenge of stigma containment.
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FROM GRACE TO VIOLENCE: 
STIGMATIZING THE MEDICAL PROFESSION IN CHINA
ABSTRACT
This study examines how the once prestigious medical profession in China has become criticized 
to the point of inducing widespread violence by patients. Drawing on archival documents, media 
articles, interviews, and secondary sources, we trace the lengthy and uneven trajectory by which 
the profession moved from collective approval through ambivalence towards stigmatization. We 
develop a process model of professional stigmatization that identifies dynamics that precipitate 
and then catalyze that trajectory; and highlight the underpinning mechanisms. By unpacking the 
complex process of stigmatization, the study extends understanding of how aspects of stigma 
emerge, and are attached by different stakeholders to a profession, and the consequences that 
follow. We conclude by highlighting implications for research on stigma and the challenge of 
stigma containment. 
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, media outlets across China reported twelve major incidents of physical violence 
committed against medical professionals in a span of just twenty days. One incident involved a 
physician being beaten by relatives of a critically ill patient; another involved a patient lacerating 
an otolaryngologist’s left eye; and a third reported an oncologist being doused with gasoline and 
burned by a patient (China News Service, June 18, 2015). This spate of incidents reflects an 
alarming trend: the frequency of physicians being assaulted by patients increased four-fold from 
the early 2000s to the 2010s—to the point that, in 2012, 64% of hospitals reported physical 
attacks on physicians (Chinese Hospital Association, 2014). Moreover, the implications are 
startling. What was once regarded as the most prestigious profession in China (Lin & Xie, 1988) 
has become accused of pervasive impropriety and deviance from important societal norms. Our 
interest is to understand how and why this dramatic fall from grace happened. In theoretical 
terms, we ask: What is the process by which stigma emerges and attaches to a profession? 
Deepening understanding of the stigmatization of professions is particularly timely given 
increasing reports of professional misbehavior—such as the role of non-disclosure agreement 
lawyers in the Weinstein affair, of accountants in the failures of Enron and Thomas Cook, of 





























































financial analysts in the subprime crisis, and of police in the death of George Floyd—which 
cumulatively suggest that the risk of professions being stigmatized is becoming a more 
widespread phenomenon (Bevan & Wilson, 2013; Brooks, 2018; Dixon-Woods, Yeung, & Bosk, 
2011). Given that professions are basic societal institutions, any collapse of confidence in them 
may have profound consequences for social stability (Muzio, Aulakh, & Kirkpatrick, 2019). 
Hence, understanding how and why professions might become stigmatized requires attention. 
However, despite the growing interest in stigma among management and organizational 
scholars (Pollock, Lashley, Rindova, & Jung-Hoon, 2019), relatively little is known about the 
stigmatization of professions—largely because they typically enjoy high social regard for their 
command of a specialized body of knowledge and their commitment to a code of ethics that 
foregrounds the interests of their clients (Brint, 1994; McMurray, 2011). Moreover, given their 
social prestige, professions often fall under the scrutiny of various stakeholders including 
regulators, the media, and their clients (Vough, Cardador, Bednar, Dane, & Pratt, 2013). How, 
then, can professions become stigmatized? Does it require that the knowledge base and the code 
of ethics both be violated? The stigmatization of professions remains an important theoretical 
conundrum that needs systematic exploration. 
Through a longitudinal, cross-level account of the medical profession in China we make 
two major contributions. Our primary contribution is an empirically derived process model of the 
stigmatization of a profession. The model specifies the distinctive momentum and the particular 
mechanisms that move a profession towards stigmatization. Whereas prior research suggests that 
ethical transgressions alone can touch off a process of stigmatization, we find that it is a 
combination of pervasive transgressions and the infliction of discernible damage to primary 
stakeholders that precipitates the process. Then, through what we call “a spiral of voice,” 





























































primary and secondary stakeholders learn of how others are expressing their 
dissatisfaction—amplifying tensions and encouraging similar expressions of dissatisfaction. 
Growing discontent with ethical transgressions is likely to pull in authoritative stakeholders, who 
are responsible for governing and monitoring the profession. Yet, their entrance can heighten 
rather than lower the perceived pervasiveness and severity of transgressions. In this way, 
authoritative stakeholders may unwittingly propel further movement towards 
stigmatization—generating a momentum that can become difficult to contain or reverse. 
Importantly, our model highlights that primary stakeholders will tend to prescribe particularly 
harsh punishments including physical violence because of the interaction of two mechanisms 
relevant to professions: impotent dependence and moral resonance. 
Our secondary contribution speaks to research on stigmatization more generally. Unlike 
previous studies that typically assume stigma to be a binary state (c.f. Hampel & Tracey, 2019), 
our case emphasizes that the process towards stigmatization may be more complex. Contrary to 
previous studies, we show that the attribution of stigma may be partial, focusing upon certain but 
not all aspects of an organization or profession—e.g., breaches to its code of ethics, but not its 
knowledge base, expertise, or competencies. Further, we show that stigmatization involves 
multiple groups of stakeholders that have different experiences and relationships with the focal 
organization or profession—not only implicating different responses, but also the potential for 
struggle and even the reversal of stigmatization. Through the actions, inaction, and countermoves 
of different stakeholders, the move towards stigmatization is likely to be a non-linear and 
oscillating process. 
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION
Stigma and the Processes of Stigmatization
Stigmas are discrediting marks, attributes or labels that trigger a wide variety of negative 





























































attitudes and beliefs (Goffman, 1963; Paetzold, Dipboye, & Elsbach, 2008). In highlighting a 
divergence or negative discrepancy from established social norms and values, stigmas impugn a 
target or bearer’s moral virtue—conjuring collective perceptions of deviance or of a 
fundamental, deep-seated flaw (Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009; Kurzban & Leary, 
2001; Link & Phelan, 2001). Whether it be an individual associated with a stigmatized social 
category (Allison, 1998; Flack et al., 1995; Pontikes, Negro, & Rao, 2010), an organization 
whose actions or core features are perceived by some audiences as somehow morally suspect or 
untrustworthy (Carberry & King, 2012; Hudson, 2008; Hampel & Tracey, 2017), or an industry 
whose activities are contested or seen as inherently harmful (Galvin, Ventresca, & Hudson, 
2004; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Vergne, 2012), stigmatization tends to come with a “significant 
price not only to the stigmatized but to society itself” (Ashforth, 2019: 25). 
Although extant research has provided valuable insights into how “preexisting stigmas” 
(Devers et al., 2009) are combated, deflected, and even co-opted (Anteby, 2010; Ashforth, 
Kreiner, Clark, & Fugate, 2007; Helms & Patterson, 2014; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Tilcsik, 
Anteby, & Knight, 2015), how stigma emerges is still somewhat of a mystery (Pescosolido & 
Martin, 2015; Pollock et al., 2019). Within the field of management and organization studies, 
two conceptual models have offered potential insights. The first, by Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, 
and Hambrick (2008), suggests that stigmatization unfolds through an “announcement” and 
denunciation of an unacceptable behavior; followed by an “assignment” of blame for that 
behavior; and then the prescription and rendering of a “judgment” regarding appropriate 
punishments. Using the example of corporate failures, Wiesenfeld et al. explain how stigma 
becomes attributed and focused on the organization’s leadership (the CEO)—and how this 
narrowing focus of blame is consolidated by pulling in more audience members, and by 





























































widening the scope of personal defects warranting derogation. It is only when there is some form 
of “de facto consensus” amongst multiple arbiters regarding culpability that stigma is “assigned” 
and a prescription of punishment is delivered (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). 
Complementing these insights, a second theoretical framework—provided by Devers et al. 
(2009)—highlights a two-stage process of stigmatization that begins with “individual labeling,” 
where one or more stakeholders identifies and denounces particular behaviors as being 
“incongruent with…deeply institutionalized norms and values” (2009: 160). If this perceived 
incongruence is seen not just as some idiosyncratic incident but as a stable and “controllable” 
underlying feature, then it breeds distrust, suspicion and perceptions of deviance. Movement to 
the second stage, of “collective labeling,” occurs when “a critical mass of stakeholder group 
members”—but not necessarily all members—accepts the label and vilification of the 
organization (Devers et al., 2009: 162; see also Jepperson & Swidler, 1994). At that point, the 
attribution becomes “persistent and self-sustaining.” 
Underscoring the socially constructed nature of the stigmatization process, both of the 
above models highlight the interpretations and societal reactions that “label” particular behaviors 
and actors as deviating from social norms. Once labeled, there is some form of punishment— 
with the scope and form dependent on the perceived severity, salaciousness, and/or malice 
associated with the negative behaviors (e.g., ethical misdeeds as opposed to incompetence). As 
Kitsuse (1962: 248) puts it, stigmatization is “a process by which the members of a group, 
community, or society (1) interpret behavior as deviant, (2) define persons who so behave as a 
certain kind of deviant, and (3) accord them the treatment considered appropriate to such 
deviants.” Stigmatization, in short, involves “collective labeling” by a “critical mass” of 
influential stakeholders that certain categories of actors are “deeply flawed and discredited” and 





























































should be penalized, devalued or vilified (Devers et al., 2009: 155; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). 
Professions and Stigma
Professions are not typically associated with being stigmatized. Their social status—based 
upon the specialized knowledge acquired through systematic training and credentialing and their 
widely recognized and oftentimes state sanctioned exclusive authority over a particular domain 
—provides professions with a privileged position “higher up the hierarchically organized 
occupational division of labour” (McMurray, 2011: 803; see also Anteby, Chan, & DiBenigno, 
2016; Leicht & Fennell, 2008). Further, their proclaimed adherence to a professional code of 
ethics suggests a commitment to ethical and competence-based standards. As Brint (1994) 
pointed out, professions justify the privileges associated with their prestige by a commitment to 
observe and prioritize social values (“social trusteeship professionalism”); combined with a 
pledge to exercise judgment based on the application of expertise (“expert professionalism”). 
Given these hallmarks of professions, it is not surprising that the literature on stigma has 
said little about them. Even the literature on occupational stigma rarely connects professions to 
the taints that define “dirty work”—i.e., “physical” (work involving refuse, death or effluent), 
“social” (work involving a servile relationship to others) or “moral” (work seen as sinful or of 
dubious virtue) (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999: 415; Ashforth et al., 2007; Kreiner, Ashforth, & 
Sluss, 2006; Ruebottom & Toubiana, 2017). 
That being said, Vough et al. (2013) warn that the service orientation of professionals 
makes them especially vulnerable to public misperceptions and to the evaluations of “primary 
stakeholders” (Freeman, Harrison, & Zyglidopolous, 2018). These stakeholders—such as 
patients and clients—are often salient “evaluators of professions” (Vough et al., 2013: 1054) 
because they interact directly and on an individual basis with professionals (Abbott, 1988; Muzio 
et al., 2019). Physicians treat patients, accounting and law firms deal with clients, and so on. This 





























































personal relationship stands in stark contrast to the impersonal distance between, on the one 
hand, a stigmatized organization that makes cigarettes or that manufactures weapons, and, on the 
other, the purchaser of those products.
At the same time, professions are subject to the evaluations of “secondary stakeholders” 
(Freeman et al., 2018) that do not directly receive professional services but that have an interest 
in the quality and safety of such services and in how the profession treats its clients. The media, 
for example, often focuses on professionals and renders and disseminates judgments of their 
moral approbation and competence (Deephouse, Bundy, Tost, & Suchman, 2017; Roulet, 2015, 
2019; Vough et al., 2013). Three other secondary stakeholders are also particularly prominent 
because of their formal role in governing the profession: professional associations (Micelotta & 
Washington, 2013; Ramirez, 2013; Swan & Newell, 1995); regulators and accreditation agencies 
(Helms, Oliver, & Webb, 2012; Sauder, 2008; Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012); and 
governments (Helfen & Sydow, 2013; Zietsma, Groenewegen, Logue, & Hinings, 2017). These 
stakeholders are “institutional custodians” (Dacin, Dacin, & Kent, 2019; Montgomery & Dacin, 
2019), monitoring moral compliance and professional competence (Currie, Lockett, Finn, 
Martin, & Waring, 2012; Helms et al., 2012). 
Despite the involvement of these secondary stakeholders, the growing number of reports of 
misbehavior by individual professionals or firms raises the possibility of professions losing 
public respect and of becoming stigmatized (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011; Gabbioneta, Prakash, & 
Greenwood, 2014; Leslie, Nelson, Deber, & Gilmour, 2018; Muzio et al., 2019). A recent poll in 
Italy, for example, shows that Italian bankers “who used to be seen as pillars of the community” 
are no longer praised and even ranked “as among the most untrustworthy professionals” (The 
Economist, 2019: 68). As yet, however, we lack empirical accounts of the process by which a 





























































profession might experience an unexpected and dramatic fall from grace. 
In approaching our case, therefore, we adopted Devers et al.’s (2009: 155) definition of 
stigma as a perception by a “critical mass” of stakeholders that a profession has a deep-seated 
flaw. In this sense, stigmatization applied to a profession is a form of “categorical stigma” 
(Piazza & Perretti, 2015; Vergne, 2012) in that stakeholders interpret and perceive “the 
profession” as a category composed of members deserving of disapproval and derogation 
because of specific patterns of behavior. It is when “a profession” is the explicit subject of 
disapproval—rather than the acts of particular members of the profession—that we can conclude 
that the profession is experiencing stigmatization. For example, the UK medical profession per 
se was not stigmatized even though one of its members—Harold Shipman—was found guilty of 
murdering 236 of his patients (Smith, 2004). Similarly, the accounting profession per se was not 
stigmatized following the collapse of one of the largest accounting firms—Arthur Andersen. As 
Dixon-Woods et al. (2011) put it “bad apples” do not necessarily imply a “bad orchard.” But if 
moral disapproval collectively refers to “the profession,” we can conclude that the profession is 
facing stigmatization—even though not all of its members behave or are treated as bad apples. 
In approaching our case, we were also mindful of Hampel and Tracey’s (2019) sensible 
reminder that the process of stigmatization involves movement along a “continuum” rather than 
an absolute binary shift from collective approval to collective disapproval. Stigmatization is a 
matter of degree. Moreover, as Helms, Patterson, and Hudson (2019) remind us, the continuum 
is not one from legitimacy to stigma, as social evaluations may have different dimensions such 
that an organization may be stigmatized due to poor labor practices and cut-throat business 
tactics, yet still be perceived as legitimate. Extending this reasoning, a profession may be 
morally and ethically tainted, but its core services and competences might still be (pragmatically) 





























































legitimate. In our case, we assessed the extent to which the “social trusteeship” dimensions of the 
medical profession lost collective approval. And, following Ashforth (2019: 27), we label the 
midway range along the continuum—where moral evaluations from stakeholders display a 
mixture of “positive and negative orientations”—as one of “ambivalence.” 
METHODS
Empirical Context and Research Design
Shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Government 
established a planned economy by nationalizing industries and collectivizing factors of 
production. As part of these reforms, all medical clinics and hospitals were absorbed into the 
state-funded public services and welfare system. The Government became the sole regulating 
authority and “all independent professional associations were disbanded” (Yao, 2016: 6). In their 
role as “state functionaries” medical professionals were expected to “serve the State, serve the 
people, and provide social welfare” (ID021). Importantly, they were forbidden from practicing 
private medicine; and, in return, they were given tenured positions and assured of a steady 
income and a wide range of benefits including pensions and housing. 
Through the 1980s and 1990s, discrepancies in the image of physicians as selfless “angels 
in white” began to surface—shortly after the introduction of economic reforms that sought to 
transition China from “a state socialist redistributive economy to a market-like economy” (Nee, 
1989: 663). As part of these reforms the Government drastically cut public health care 
funding—compelling hospitals to seek alternative sources of financing. Hospitals began 
pressuring physicians to generate revenue, which effectively shifted their attention away from 
serving the people to seeking profits. This shift created strong incentives to overprescribe and 
charge mark-ups on prescription drugs (Sun et al., 2008; Zhu, 2007). Adding fuel to the fire, the 
1 In the following text, all references to interviews are noted using the format (IDX) to refer to the particular 
interviewee. For example, ID02 means interviewee number two. 





























































Government introduced a new health insurance scheme in 1998 that reduced the reimbursable 
portion of medical expenditures—leaving patients personally responsible for a substantial part of 
their medical bills. 
As public dissatisfaction and tensions between physicians and patients increased, the 
Government scaled back its marketization efforts in the health care sector. Through the 
mid-2000s, it sought to restore the “socialist nature” of the health care system and social 
approval of the medical profession. It denounced professional misconduct and urged the public 
to cease aggressive behavior towards physicians. Despite these calls for restraint, however, the 
media continued to vilify the profession—and incidents of violence rose dramatically in a society 
where such acts were not typical (UNODC, 2018; WHO, 2002a). 
This dramatic change in attitudes towards the medical profession reflects an “extreme” 
case—one that provides the opportunity to gain “insights into processes and mechanisms that 
may not be as easily discernible under more moderate conditions” (Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 
2010: 1340; see also Eisenhardt, 1989; Pratt, 2000; Raynard, Lu, & Jing, 2020). Given the 
characteristics of our case, we employed an inductive, exploratory research design that covered 
the period from 1985 to 2015. 
Data Collection
To unpack how the stigmatization process unfolded we collected archival documents, media 
articles, and secondary materials—with the aim of capturing different perspectives and insights 
into key events and changes in the health care sector. We also conducted multiple rounds of 
interviews to not only gain a better understanding of the first-hand experiences of physicians and 
patients, but also to verify and refine our emerging interpretations. 
Archival documents. To create a contextual backdrop and chronological narrative in which 
to situate the stigmatization process, we collected national, provincial, and organizational level 





























































archival documents. National level government documents outlined regulatory interventions in 
the health care system. Provincial level governmental reports described how those regulatory 
changes were implemented and prioritized on the ground. At the organization level, we 
examined internal documents from two hospitals in a major coastal city, where marketization 
efforts were especially pronounced, and where a large number of medical disputes had been 
reported. We focused on documents outlining changes to hospital policies regarding incentive 
systems for physicians and drug pricing. To verify that the changes in hospital policies were 
representative we discussed these documents with elite interviewees. In addition, we collected 
documents from the official websites and regional branches of the Chinese Medical Doctor 
Association, which was established in 2002, and from the Chinese Hospital Association, 
established in 2006. 
Media articles. To capture media depictions and judgments we collected articles and reports 
from multiple major news outlets. We began by collecting articles from the People’s Daily, one 
of China’s most influential and authoritative media outlets and the Communist Party’s official 
newspaper. Using key phrases and synonyms—including a combination of “professional ethics 
(zhiye daode)” with “physicians (yisheng)” or with “hospitals (yiyuan),” and “medical 
professional ethics (yi de/yi feng)”—we collected 2,104 articles, published between 1985 and 
2015. After removing those that merely mentioned, but did not actually comment upon 
professional ethics, we compiled a dataset of 1,390 articles. 
Additionally, to better understand the changing perspective of patients we created a separate 
dataset of articles that reported on patient dissatisfaction between 1985 (one year before the first 
reported dispute) and 2015. Through consultations with interviewees and two professors from 
prestigious Chinese universities who study doctor-patient relationships, we derived a list of key 





























































phrases and synonyms that would capture the condemnation and vilification by patients of 
physicians—e.g., “medical dispute” (yiliao jiufen), “doctor-patient dispute” (yihuan jiufen), 
“doctor-patient conflict” (yihuan chongtu), and “medical disruption” (yi nao, also translated as 
medical profiteer). Applying this list, we identified 756 articles—which we later separated into 
those involving verbal or physical violence, and those that did not. 
To corroborate data collected from the People’s Daily, we conducted similar article 
searches in the Guangming Daily and the Economic Daily, which target professionals and 
business people. Although these articles only cover the period from 2000 to the present, they 
nonetheless provided a means to triangulate and validate our emerging findings. For further 
corroboration, we probed two of the largest governmental news websites (Xinhua Net and China 
News Service); three of the largest private news websites (Tecent, NetEase, and Sina); and one 
international source, the Financial Times (Chinese)—which captured perspectives from both 
government-controlled and private news outlets. 
Interviews. Our third data source was semi-structured interviews, which provided important 
insights into the “lived experience” of physicians and patients (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2014; 
Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke, & Spee, 2015), and that also served as a means by which to 
enhance the trustworthiness of our interpretations and findings (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). We 
conducted three waves of interviews. In the first wave, we conducted 10 pilot interviews with 
physicians to explore their experience and understandings of relationships with patients. In the 
second wave, we spoke with 28 medical professionals to better understand their perspective. 
Last, we spoke with 30 patients to gain insight into their experiences with medical professionals. 
All interviewees were identified through a snowball sampling technique. Interviews with 
physicians covered different professional ranks (from chief physician to resident physician), 





























































leadership positions, and hospital affiliations (i.e., provincial, municipal, and district hospitals). 
Of these interviewees, 19 entered the profession before 1985 and were thus able to compare 
experiences before and after the reforms; and 5 held multiple senior positions2 that required 
regular interactions with multiple stakeholders. We regarded these latter five as “elite 
interviewees” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999) because they were in ideal positions to experience 
the pressures exerted on hospitals by the Government and the media, and could explain to us the 
rationale behind some seemingly contradictory phenomena. Approximately half of the patients 
were born before the 1970s and personally experienced the phenomenon under investigation. 
All interviews were conducted on-site in two major municipalities in two province-level 
regions where marketization and stigmatization of the medical profession were particularly 
salient. To understand the scope and generalizability of our informants’ experiences and 
opinions, we presented our emergent insights to physicians who had practiced medicine in 14 
other province level regions. We also approached patients who had worked or studied in 16 other 
province level regions (e.g., Shanghai, Guangdong, Fujian, Tianjin, Liaoning, Qinghai). These 
discussions reinforced the perception that the move towards stigmatization was a national rather 
than regional phenomenon—even though its intensity might be lower in less marketized 
provinces. All interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese and lasted between 40 and 90 
minutes—except for four of the “elite” interviews, which each lasted for two hours. Interviews 
were recorded, transcribed and then translated. The first author and a research assistant 
conducted 16 of the interviews together in order to minimize interviewer bias (Patton, 2002). 
Secondary materials. To corroborate our measures of patient dissatisfaction and of 
physicians’ experiences, we collected statistics from secondary sources: the National Bureau of 
2 All five elite interviewees had been hospital presidents in their career. Four had also served as health 
department officers in the Government. Three of them had presided at regional branches of professional 
associations. As such, their career paths represent those of elite members of the medical profession.





























































Statistics’ Health Yearbooks; and surveys by the Ministry of Health, the Chinese Hospital 
Association (CHA), and the Chinese Medical Doctor Association (CMDA). These sources 
provided data on patients as well as physicians—e.g., personal non-reimbursable health 
expenses, the frequency of verbal abuse and physical assault in hospitals, and the percentage of 
physicians who wanted to quit their job. The majority of the surveys had broad coverage—the 
2012 CHA survey, for example, received responses from 8,388 physicians in 316 hospitals 
across thirty provinces. As an additional corroboration, we examined editorials in medical 
journals such as The Lancet. These accounts provided additional insight into the chronology of 
stigmatization, as well as the role of the various stakeholders involved. 
Data Analysis
After assembling the data, we created a chronological narrative of major changes in the 
health sector, including the introduction of market practices and new health insurance schemes, 
and their implications at the provincial and organizational levels. Once we had developed this 
cross-level narrative, we turned our attention to unpacking the process and mechanisms of 
professional stigmatization that unfolded in our case. 
Identifying and mapping shifting stakeholder evaluations. We began by identifying public 
statements by the Government, which explicitly evaluated professional conduct and ethics. After 
marking these on the chronological timeline, we identified the evaluations of other stakeholders 
(e.g., the media) in order to assess how they compared to, and mapped onto, the Government’s 
statements. To gain a better understanding of the implications for the profession, we asked 
physicians whether and how these statements and evaluations affected their relationships with 
patients. We also examined documents from the professional associations to discern if and how 
they responded and the extent to which they were influenced by other stakeholders. We then 
consulted our elite interviewees about the role of the associations and other stakeholders. 





























































Next, we identified shifts in the portrayal of the medical profession by the media—focusing, 
in particular, on articles that included explicit statements on professional conduct and ethics. 
Following Piazza and Perretti (2015), the first author read and analyzed each article, coding for 
whether the coverage was “negative” (i.e., if it presented a disapproving view of professional 
ethics); “positive” (i.e., if it presented an approving view); or, “neutral” (if it reported 
ethics-related facts that do not have immediate connotations or presented an impartial view). 
Table 1 provides details on how the articles were coded and illustrative examples of each code. 
Two of the authors and a field expert formalized the coding scheme by independently coding a 
subsample of 50 articles and then discussing and reconciling divergences in the coding results. 
Further, we differentiated between articles that attributed blame to individual members of the 
profession and those that attributed it to the profession. To verify the reliability of our coding we 
asked a Chinese physician to reclassify a random subsample of 100 articles. The Cohen’s kappa 
value for the two ratings was 0.83, indicating a high level of inter-rater agreement (Fleiss, 1981). 
--------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
--------------------------------------------------
Once we were confident that we had adequately captured shifts in the media’s portrayal and 
evaluation of professional conduct and ethics, we turned our attention to evaluations by patients. 
We captured changes in their evaluations by, first, examining media articles that reported 
disputes between physicians and patients; and, second, through interviews with patients. For the 
disputes reported in media articles, we separated those that involved violence from those that did 
not. Following the World Health Organization’s (2002b) definition of workplace violence in 
health services, and consistent with previous studies of violence in hospitals (e.g., Carmi-Iluz, 
Peleg, Freud, & Shvartzman, 2005), we define “violence” as incidents when medical 





























































professionals are abused, threatened or assaulted. This definition includes both “physical 
violence” (e.g., beating, kicking, slapping, stabbing, shooting) and “psychological violence” (i.e., 
verbal abuse, bullying, mobbing, harassment, and threats). By applying these criteria to the 756 
articles reporting doctor-patient disputes we identified 220 articles that reported violent disputes, 
of which163 involved physical violence. 
To verify the temporal patterns we examined articles from alternative news outlets and 
surveys conducted by the Chinese Hospital Association—which recorded a similar rise in the 
number of disputes and a notable increase in violence (as defined by WHO). To flesh out these 
trends and gain a more nuanced understanding of the patterns, we examined our interview data to 
identify whether and how patients and physicians respectively perceived changes in 
doctor-patient relationships, and to what extent these changes affected and were affected by how 
they perceived the profession (e.g., whether they felt ashamed to be medical professionals). 
Developing core concepts and relationships. Having mapped the changes in how different 
stakeholder groups perceived the ethical standards of the profession, we turned, first, to why their 
evaluations moved from collective approval through ambivalence (a mixture of negative and 
positive evaluations) towards stigmatization. We then addressed why primary stakeholders 
prescribed harsher punishments (e.g., physical violence) than those prescribed by secondary 
stakeholders. 
To understand the shift from collective approval to ambivalence we drew upon existing 
research that suggests that ethical violations would be an important starting point (e.g., Devers et 
al., 2009; Hudson, 2008; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). As we dug into the data, however, it became 
clear that it was the volume, scale, and financial implications of unethical professional practices 
that were driving factors in the denunciation and attribution of blame—which we label 





























































“pervasive transgressions” and “damage.” In the same way, our data implicated a “spiral of 
voice” as stakeholders became aware of, and followed, others’ evaluations and behaviors—e.g., 
“The more incidents the media reported and broadcasted, the more aware patients are of how 
other patients are responding, and the more likely they imitate and resort to disputes” (ID17). 
We used the same analytical procedure to understand why ambivalence turned towards 
stigmatization. From various data sources, we discerned the influence of the “authoritative 
judgment”—noting how the media and patients followed the Government’s public shaming of 
systemic unethical practices of the profession. To understand why physical violence increased 
drastically, we analyzed our interviews with patients to probe the reasons for their anger. We 
found statements such as: “Physicians deserve violent punishments because they are not 
supposed to hurt helpless patients. Instead, they are supposed to be noble and save people” 
(ID55). Two mechanisms surfaced: “moral resonance”—i.e., the closeness and association of a 
profession to the core values of society; and “impotent dependence”—i.e., the significantly 
imbalanced professional-client relationships in which clients are highly dependent on 
professional expertise. 
Establishing trustworthiness. Throughout, we sought to ensure the trustworthiness of our 
interpretations and findings through triangulation of multiple data sources (Guba & Lincoln, 
2005). Table 2 shows the triangulation of data for each concept and also provides illustrative 
examples. In addition, we engaged in “member checks” (Langley & Abdallah, 2011) by 
presenting preliminary findings to elite interviewees. We also benefited from having a variant of 
the “insider-outsider” approach (Gioia, Price, Hamilton, & Thomas, 2010; Louis & Bartunek, 
1992; Smets et al., 2015) in that the first author has intimate knowledge of the setting on account 
of having several generations of family members in the medical profession in China; while the 





























































third author held a more “distant” perspective and adopted the role of “devil’s advocate” (Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2012: 19). The second author, being very familiar with the Chinese context, 
acted as sounding board for both sides. 
--------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
--------------------------------------------------
FINDINGS
Our analysis surfaced three phases, each defined by movement along the continuum from 
collective approval through ambivalence towards stigmatization. In the first phase, beginning in 
1985, physicians began engaging in practices of questionable ethical appropriateness, and, 
surprisingly, did so without incurring social disapproval. Beginning in 1998, however, the 
situation changed. Unethical practices became more pervasive and attitudes towards the 
profession shifted from collective approval to one of ambivalence, particularly as concerns grew 
over the financial implications for patients. In 2005, the situation worsened. The Government 
and then the media publicly denounced the unethical transgressions and attributed blame to the 
profession. Social evaluation of the profession moved from one of ambivalence towards one of 
stigmatization. Strikingly, in this phase, violence against physicians rose sharply. 
The overarching story is visualized in Figures 1 and 2. The former shows the increasingly 
negative media attitudes towards professional ethics, and the latter the gradual and then 
steepening rise in doctor-patient disputes and acts of violence. Below we present our empirical 
findings chronologically, illustrating the mechanisms that moved the social evaluations held by 
primary and secondary stakeholders towards stigmatization. After presenting our findings, we 
detail the full model, situating it within extant stigma research. 
--------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 & Figure 2 about here
--------------------------------------------------





























































Beginnings: The Spread of Pervasive Transgressions (1985–1997)
The starting point of the story is 1985 when new regulations stipulated that while regular 
medical services would continue to be fully reimbursed, “special-demand” (te xu) services and 
drugs would not.3 Hospitals began charging patients a 15% mark-up for all drugs, and 
encouraged physicians to prescribe special-demand treatments not covered by the public health 
insurance scheme (State Council, 1989). These behaviors were further augmented in the early 
1990s, when the Government pushed hospitals to replace “the egalitarian distribution of salaries” 
(Ministry of Health, 1992) with profit-seeking incentive systems that would make physicians 
more cognizant of the need to generate revenues for hospitals: 
If a physician generates a net profit of 2,000 yuan per month (through prescriptions and 
surgeries), the physician will receive 15% of the profit as a bonus. For the next 2,000 yuan of 
net profit generated, the physician will receive 17%; for the third, 19%; for the fourth, 17%; 
and for the fifth, 15%. (Internal document from a municipal hospital) 
Transgressions of physicians. The seeming compromising of professional behavior 
triggered a sense of unease amongst physicians for whom the business-like approach ran “against 
the old norms” (ID26) and “against socialism” (ID06). A chief physician in a major hospital 
commented: “At the beginning, many of us felt awkward… How could we take bonuses if we 
were to serve the people?” (ID04). Nevertheless, linking compensation to revenue generation, 
which was originally intended to be “more of an encouragement rather than a requirement” 
(ID06), “gradually became a common practice” (ID01). An important unintended consequence 
was that many physicians became less circumspect in prescribing drugs and many began 
overprescribing—as seen in the increasingly “standard” practice of prescribing the 
“three-element soup” (sansu yitang) (i.e., a glucose injection of antibiotics, hormones, and 
vitamins) for various types of minor ailments (ID02). The justification was that “even if a patient 
3 Whereas the regular health care includes regular clinical consultation, regular prescriptions, and necessary 
surgeries, special-demand services typically include customized clinical consultation, imported drugs, plastic 
surgeries (e.g., laser hair removal, rouge removal), luxury delivery room services, etc. 





























































did not need these drugs, prescribing them would not hurt the patient; and, more importantly, 
charging for those drugs was easy money” (ID21). Our interviewees reported that there was no 
collective effort to stem the transgressions—in part, because there was no self-regulatory 
professional association in this phase.4 
Despite the growing pervasiveness of overprescribing, the media in general did not criticize 
the profession. As shown in Figure 1, between 1985 and 1997, of the 469 articles in the People’s 
Daily that referred to professional ethics only 64 (14%) did so in a critical way. In contrast, 291 
(62%) were highly positive, praising physicians for their high ethical standards: “these medical 
professionals are not only skillful but also ethical and noble, and have a heart of gold” (People’s 
Daily, Sept 16, 1989). Moreover, 45 of the 64 negative articles criticized specific physicians or 
hospitals involved in the unethical practice, depicting them as exceptions in an otherwise 
ethically respectful profession: “there are indeed a few medical professionals who violate 
professional ethics, ignore the patients’ pain, and are extremely irresponsible…” (People’s Daily, 
Dec 27, 1994). Overall, media portrayals of the medical profession remained highly positive, a 
pattern confirmed by older physicians: “The media did not immediately target us after the market 
reform… The image of medical professionals in the newspapers was still positive” (ID07). 
The relative absence of media criticism could be explained, in part, by the lack of 
complaints from patients, as suggested by elder interviewees: “the media did not become hostile 
to physicians because people did not condemn overprescribing” (ID45). As shown in Figure 2, 
between 1985 and 1998, only 14 articles in the People’s Daily reported disputes between doctors 
and patients. Similarly, a government survey of 100 major hospitals reported a yearly average of 
only 2.3 disputes per hospital. At that time, as our elder interviewees confirmed, “The 
4 All self-regulatory professional associations were disbanded after 1949. Although the Chinese Medical 
Association survived it “only functioned academically” and self-regulation was assumed by the Government 
(Yao, 2016: 8; Davis, 2000). In this phase there was no equivalent to Western associations. 





























































relationship between doctors and patients remained harmonious. On-call doctors would chat with 
patients, and patients’ families sometimes brought supper or snacks for doctors… Physicians did 
not feel, as they feel today, that patients were against them. Disputes were rare” (ID23). 
Thus, although this phase saw a rise of medical practices that ran counter to deeply 
established socialist norms, the medical profession was still positively portrayed in the media. 
Moreover, there were few signs of disapproval or criticism from patients. Primary (patients) and 
secondary (the media) stakeholders, in other words, still held the profession in high regard. 
However, the shift from collective approval to a more ambivalent assessment was about to begin. 
Precipitating the Shift towards Ambivalence (1998–2004)
Discernible damage and escalating disputes. The tipping point was the introduction of a 
new health insurance scheme that inflicted “damage” on patients because they would no longer 
be able to claim full reimbursement for regular medical expenses. In Shenzhen, where the new 
scheme was piloted, patients were now responsible for paying approximately 30% of their 
clinical bills. From 1998 to 2003, non-reimbursable medical expenses increased annually by 
13%—making health care the third largest personal expense after food and education by the end 
of this phase (Ministry of Health, 1999, 2004). Hence, the perception that health care was a 
public welfare service was compromised, an outcome the media blamed upon increasingly 
profit-oriented practices: 
“Expensive medical treatment” has become a major barrier for patients to seek medical 
attention. It has now become common for patients to try “living with sickness as much as 
possible”… The price of the drugs is high; and because physicians “overprescribe,” things are 
even worse. (People’s Daily, Jan 4, 2001, emphasis added) 
Nevertheless, physicians felt pressured to continue such practices because their salaries and 
promotions depended upon the revenue generated for the hospital. As an elite interviewee 
candidly stated: “Foreign physicians rely on professional skills to make money whereas Chinese 





























































physicians rely on selling drugs” (ID08). In similar vein, the Guangming Daily later reported that 
“Our country has the most serious antibiotics overuse problem in the world…The average annual 
consumption of antibiotics per person in China is 138 grams, which is ten times that in 
America… Physicians are incentivized by profits in [overprescribing] drugs—which has become 
an unspoken rule in the profession” (Oct 19, 2011, emphasis added). 
It was increasingly evident that doctor-patient relationships had “significantly changed.” 
Whereas patients had previously been able to reclaim most medical expenses, they were now 
beginning to suffer direct and discernible “harm.” Consequently, as Figure 2 shows, 
doctor-patient disputes increased noticeably. From 1998 to 2004, the People’s Daily published 
101 articles reporting disputes, substantially exceeding the 14 of the previous phase. Likewise, 
between 2000 and 2004, the Guangming Daily and the Economic Daily published 106 articles 
describing patients confronting physicians. An elder patient angrily complained: “Physicians 
must have black hearts! When sick people go to them for help, all they care about is prescribing 
all sorts of uncovered examinations and expensive drugs. How could patients possibly be 
satisfied?” (ID57). Another patient added: “Where are their consciences? Physicians have no 
shame…I sympathize with those who confronted the immoral physicians” (ID58). 
Ambivalence of secondary stakeholders. As the disputes increased, the tone of media 
articles became more critical. As shown in Figure 1, there was a shift in the relative proportions 
of positive and negative depictions. Whereas in the previous phase the majority (62%) of articles 
on professional ethics published in the People’s Daily had been positive, the balance shifted 
between 1998 and 2004—with positive articles dropping to 43% and negative ones increasing to 
one third (120) of 359 articles. The media urged physicians to be “more compassionate and 
caring,” and more attentive to “serving the people” because their cold and uncaring attitude was 





























































provoking patients’ anger: 
Some medical professionals are contaminated with the idea of “seeking nothing but money,” 
which leaves them a hidden hazard for medical disputes… Medical professionals should 
correct their relationships with patients and recognize that medical practices should be sacred. 
(People’s Daily, Oct 21, 1999) 
Moreover, the collective approval once enjoyed by the profession had been lost. Instead, the 
problem was increasingly seen as systemic: “the moral decline has become a problem for the 
profession…as many people [in health care] have lost professional ethics and conscience” 
(People’s Daily, Feb 8, 2001). Of the 120 articles that adopted a negative view, 74 explicitly 
criticized the moral behavior of the profession—not of individual professionals. Physicians, now 
labeled “wolves in white” (bai lang), were uncomfortably aware of how the media were 
dramatizing these criticisms and painting the profession as unethical:
As overprescribing became widespread, the media began to put a general label on the 
profession, making unethical behaviors part of a stereotypical physician. Such labeling made 
the unethical issues a professional characteristic and cognitively easier for people to recognize. 
(ID15, emphasis added) 
Despite the increasingly critical stance of the media, and the deepening dissatisfaction with 
the profession, the 2002–2003 SARS epidemic provided some respite, but this proved 
short-lived. At first, medical professionals were praised by the media for their commitment to 
saving patients’ lives—with some even being portrayed as martyrs after they fell victim to the 
epidemic. President Hu Jintao publicly expressed his condolence to the families, friends, and 
colleagues of those who died “fighting” SARS: 
The medical professionals fighting in the front lines are carrying forward the spirit of selfless 
dedication and saving the wounded and dying; with a heroic spirit and fearlessness, they are 
fulfilling their duties, sacrificing themselves, and wholeheartedly dedicating themselves to the 
responsibility of treating patients… (People’s Daily, Apr 26, 2003)
Recalling the harrowing epidemic, an associate chief physician remarked: “During SARS, people 
were focusing on how brave physicians were in their effort to help people. Even the media were 
on our side for a moment. CCTV was playing documentaries about how physicians were saving 





























































lives…” (ID25). The pandemic provided “an unexpected platform for physicians’ noble tradition 
—dedicating our lives to saving others—to be highlighted, even just temporarily” (ID09). 
Once the epidemic was over, however, the media quickly resumed its highlighting of the 
unethical practices of physicians—even claiming that their heroic deeds could not erase the 
pervasive misconduct plaguing the profession: “During the fight against SARS last year, the vast 
number of warriors in white won the respect of the society with their practical actions. However, 
their misdeeds cannot be covered by their credits, just as ugliness cannot be covered by 
beauty…” (People’s Daily, Apr 2, 2004). As an elder patient put it: 
While media attention was temporarily drawn to the bravery of some physicians, 
overprescribing remained widespread after the SARS epidemic. In fact, the epidemic 
highlighted the discrepancy between the noble traditional image of the profession, and the 
reality of their everyday practices. (ID61, emphasis added)
Similarly, as one chief-physician bemoaned, “social approval was revived during the SARS 
epidemic, but only for a moment. It was shocking how quickly SARS was used as a means not to 
praise, but to condemn us” (ID33). In short, the abrupt respite brought by the epidemic had 
unintentionally drawn public attention to “the sheer contrast between the physicians’ widespread 
misconduct and their rarely seen heroism” (ID59). 
A different, albeit authoritative, secondary stakeholder—the Government—played a quieter 
role. It did not directly intervene at this point and, instead, focused on monitoring performance in 
the health care sector through annual statistics (e.g., hospitals revenues, and patient coverage) 
and governmental surveys conducted every five years to measure the success rates of medical 
treatments, the level of patient satisfaction, and the costs incurred by patients. Results from the 
1998 survey (the beginning of this phase) were largely positive, especially in terms of treatment 
outcomes. As a health department officer recounted: “Most of our daily work was dedicated to 
examining the quality of health services. As long as there were no major problems, or scandals, 





























































we did not pay as much attention to professional ethics” (ID01). 
Spiral of voice. However, as primary and secondary stakeholders began learning of how 
others were expressing their dissatisfaction, there was a spiral of voice—i.e., an amplification 
and encouragement of similar expressions of dissatisfaction. Our interviewees repeatedly pointed 
to the media’s role in amplifying tensions and fueling the escalating dissatisfaction and anger of 
patients. As one patient pointed out: “if it were not for the media we would not see how 
widespread those unethical behaviors were. Such reports really made people angry…” (ID52). 
Patients, in other words, were learning from the media how others were responding in aggressive 
ways and, by implication, that such responses were acceptable:
Media reports exaggerated the severity of doctor-patient conflict… Imagine that you were a 
client and were dissatisfied with my service; your first reaction might be to reason with me. 
But now that you read all those negative newspaper articles, you suddenly realize that you 
should lash out at me… An overly large number of media articles reporting on disputes easily 
triggered the ripple effects that stimulated more disputes. (ID20) 
Moreover, the media almost exclusively focused on the misdeeds of physicians while 
downplaying any possibility that patients might also be at fault. One physician complained: “our 
profession is being portrayed as full of ‘villains’ whereas patients are always the victims. The 
media have totally taken the side of the patients but not with us…” (ID05). As medical 
professionals saw it, patients were being told to confront their physicians—the consequence of 
which was the exacerbation of patient frustrations, and the emboldening of their actions: 
These negative articles did not just vilify the medical profession. After such misleading articles 
were published, the number of disputes increased rapidly. We would see groups of forty or 
fifty people gathering together, holding huge banners, shouting slogans and passing out flyers 
in front of hospitals. They disrespect doctors and are aggressive. Such incidents have become 
more common, after the publication of these articles. (ID17, emphasis added) 
Interviewees who had entered the profession before 1998 confirmed that they had 
experienced a loss of social respect, and described doctor-patient relationships as “worsening” 
and “deteriorating”—such that by 2004, a national survey reported that 63% of physicians had 





























































serious reservations about their children entering the profession (Chinese Medical Doctor 
Association, 2004). 
Strained tolerance. Despite this loss of social approval, the practice of overprescribing and 
of questionable ethical conduct continued. As Yao, a scholar of medical sociology, later 
commented, “doctors always compromise their professional ethics during practice because they 
are unable to make decisions based only on medical knowledge; they have to consider economic 
interests as well” (2016: 14). In response, some physicians became more cynical about the 
profession, and others left it—rarely, however, did any member publicly rebel. An associate 
chief physician cynically remarked: “To physicians, hospitals may mean a tenured job, secured 
social benefits and pension, but to hospitals every physician is just a contract of employment. 
The stakes are too high for us to go against systemic transgressions” (ID25). For those who were 
reluctant to embrace overprescribing, the choice was to tolerate such practices or “be sidelined 
and punished” (ID22). The overwhelming outcome was strained tolerance. 
Nevertheless, a small number of physicians did protest, but were seen by their colleagues as 
“Don Quixote type of heroes” who were doomed to fail. An elder interviewee recollected: 
A former subordinate of mine, a brilliant young man, got sick of the growing misconduct. He 
could not stand such practices, so he often shamed those colleagues who were known to 
overprescribe. But alone he could not stop them… Eventually he chose to quit the profession 
in the early 2000s. And guess what he decided to do afterwards? He became a journalist who 
specialized in reporting physicians’ unethical behavior. (ID09)
The inability of physicians to counteract the momentum towards stigmatization could be 
partially attributed to the absence of a powerful professional association—which might have 
provided a collective and authoritative voice. Indeed, the Chinese Medical Doctor Association 
was only established in 2002, and so lacked the experience and capacity to police the profession 
or to openly challenge the media. In the minds of physicians, the association was invisible: “We 
knew the association was being created, but barely knew what it was actually doing” (ID19). 





























































Catalyzing Collective Labeling and Divergent Punishments (2005–2015)
Authoritative judgment. The increasingly negative perceptions of the medical profession 
had reached a point that was now difficult for the Government to ignore. As one informant 
remarked: “Starting in the late 1990s, more and more people were complaining about the 
costliness of medical services” and questioning whether “health care was a public service” 
(ID13). By 2004, the Government’s own five-year survey had revealed that 57% of urban 
residents avoided going to hospitals because of the costs that would be incurred; and that the 
average expense for an in-patient visit was now equal to the annual income of an average 
employee (Ministry of Health, 2004). Reflecting upon this trend, the former president of a 
municipal hospital stated: “we are a socialist country after all. Once public health care becomes 
something people cannot afford, the Government needs to fix it… It has to make health care 
affordable; otherwise, it loses face” (ID06). 
Growing public outcry prompted the Government to step in and criticize physicians’ 
“massive overprescribing at the cost of patients’ health” (National Research Center, 2005). It 
directed blame at the medical profession—claiming that the violation of professional ethics had 
undermined public perceptions of health care: 
Public health care institutes are…neglecting the nature of public welfare… even at the cost of 
people’s interests… Hospitals’ profit-seeking tendency has not only led to expensive and 
inaccessible medical services for the people, but also seriously impacted the societal image of 
medical professionals and of the medical profession… (Ministry of Health, 2005, emphasis 
added) 
Over the next several years, the Government called upon the profession to return to and 
uphold its public welfare role. An official document, Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the 
Medical and Health Care System (2009), urged hospitals to “put patients at the center, optimize 
the service process, and standardize drug use, examinations, and clinical behavior.” To further 
stem the practice of overprescribing, the Government no longer allowed hospitals to charge 





























































patients a 15% mark-up on drugs. Yet, while doing so, the Government did not compensate 
hospitals for the resulting loss in revenues. Physicians thus “had no choice but to keep 
overprescribing unnecessary examinations and drugs not covered by health insurance in order to 
keep up with the profit shortage caused by the repeal” (ID16). Our informants caustically pointed 
to the problems caused by the Government’s policy changes: 
Those socialist slogans are hollow. No [physician] would believe them. The Government is 
sending misleading messages to patients and the public… Health care has already become a 
business instead of a public welfare service. But the Government talks about it as if it is all 
about social welfare. It is difficult to go back to the old days. (ID24)
By publicly calling for the profession to cease its unethical conduct, however, the 
Government unintentionally tipped the scales and escalated public disapproval. As one informant 
reflected, when “the Government began to publicly denounce the profession around the 
mid-2000s, everything changed… To begin with, the media started to follow the Government’s 
vilification of the profession” (ID10). In effect, the Government had rendered an “authoritative 
judgment” that the unethical behavior of the profession was seriously misaligned with China’s 
socialist principles and, in doing so, prompted others to take that same stance. 
Collective labeling among stakeholders. The full range of media channels—newspapers, 
television, and radio—followed the Government’s narrative and stridently denounced the 
profession as “decadent and immoral” (Sina, Dec 7, 2005), of “losing the patients’ trust” 
(Guangming Daily, Jan 23, 2006), and of being “dishonored” (Sina, Dec 12, 2005). In a joint 
survey, Sina and CCTV proclaimed that 94% of the 17,638 respondents agreed that respect for 
the medical profession had collapsed (Sept 28, 2005). From 2005 to 2015, 291 (52%) of 562 
articles in the People’s Daily had adopted a critical view of professional ethics—with 229 





























































explicitly blaming the profession as opposed to individual professionals.5 In contrast, of the 114 
(20%) articles that presented a positive view, the majority praised individual professionals. 
NetEase succinctly summarized the situation: “The media have collectively fallen into 
stigmatizing doctors” (Oct 30, 2013). In other words, the collective portrayal of the profession in 
the media resonated with that of the Government: “Physicians today are no longer ‘angels in 
white’ in the public eyes. Physicians are stigmatized” (People’s Daily, Nov 22, 2013). 
Notably, however, both the Government and the media focused on the unethical behaviors 
of the profession, not its expertise or competence: “Between doctors and patients there is only 
trust in skill, but rarely trust in ethics” (People’s Daily, Jan 25, 2013). Likewise, one informant 
noted that, “The younger physicians are generally more skillful than the older generation” 
(ID03). Indeed, the percentage of patients whose health issues were effectively treated increased 
from 95.5% to 96.8%; and the percentage of physicians who obtained postgraduate degrees after 
their bachelor of medicine grew from 4.3% to 11.4% from 2005 to 2013 (Health Yearbooks). 
Sharing in this denunciation of ethical lapses, patients openly blamed the medical 
profession at large: “I have been to big hospitals and small hospitals; I have seen chief physicians 
and less experienced physicians… All of them could be untrustworthy and unethical. I believe it 
is a problem for the profession” (ID54). One patient even went as far as stating: 
Today, the medical profession is the most black-hearted occupation…It is a societal 
consensus. There is no physician who has not overprescribed. This is a profession that has no 
conscience. I hope they will die of bad karma and retribution for their wrongdoing. (ID61, 
emphasis added)
For patients, the medical profession had coalesced into a category of “similar individuals, 
5 In addition, we examined different unethical issues—“overprescribing,” “taking kickbacks,” and “soliciting 
bribes”—criticized by the media and found the same pattern. In the first phase, each misconduct was primarily 
attributed to individual members of the profession, whereas in the later phases they were increasingly 
attributed to the profession. For example, in the first phase of the 21 articles critical of overprescribing only 4 
(20%) blamed the profession, whereas in the third phase 157 (82%) of 192 articles did so. 





























































engaged in systemic unethical and malevolent activities” (ID42). 
This collective labeling by primary and secondary stakeholders was not lost on medical 
professionals. Our interviewees repeatedly complained that “the media put dirty labels such as 
‘immorality’ and ‘greed’ on the profession as if we were all the same” (ID23, emphasis added). 
They felt that: “No matter whether you are a chief physician or a resident physician… as long as 
you wear a white coat, you are the same in the patients’ eyes” (ID09). 
Divergent prescriptions of punishment. Despite collectively attributing unethical behaviors 
to the profession as a category, primary and secondary stakeholders differed in their perceptions 
of the appropriate punishments that should follow. Primary stakeholders increasingly expressed 
their disapproval in aggressive ways. Between 2005 and 2015, not only did reports of 
doctor-patient disputes increase six-fold, incidents of violence rose sharply (see Figure 2). By 
2012, nearly two thirds of hospitals across China had reported incidents of physical violence, 
60% of physicians had suffered verbal abuse and threats, and 13% physical abuse (Chinese 
Hospital Association, 2014; Chinese Medical Doctor Association, 2015). Critically, these 
incidences were occurring across the spectrum of clinical departments and hospitals—small and 
large, and at provincial, municipal and district levels (Zhang & Zhao, 2014). 
Moreover, there was a sharp increase in random incidents of abuse and violence. Nearly 
11% of physically violent incidents involved physicians with whom patients had had no prior 
interactions (Yao, 2017). Particularly striking was that these incidents were taking place “with 
the tolerance of the general public” (Wu, Wang, Lam, & Hesketh, 2014: 8). In an online survey 
of how readers felt about the murder of a physician by a patient whom he had never treated, 65% 
of 6,161 respondents selected “happy” rather than “sympathetic,” “sad” or “angry” (Tecent, Mar 
26, 2012). This growing randomness of violence, and the wider public’s response to it, signaled 





























































that the profession was being targeted for punishment: “when a patient randomly chooses the 
target for retaliation, it is because the patient distrusts the medical profession” (ID07). 
However, the response of primary stakeholders differed from that of secondary 
stakeholders—who, instead, resorted to “shaming” the profession and urging its members to 
resume their traditional role as upholders of socialism (e.g., State Council, 2009): “Public 
hospitals have become ‘shopping malls’ while the value of the health profession has been 
distorted… The nature of heath care as a public welfare service should be upheld” (People’s 
Daily, Jan 15, 2009). The Government expressly condemned unethical behaviors and made it 
clear that such actions would be penalized and could lead to the loss of the license to practice 
(Ministry of Health, 2007). In short, emphasis for secondary stakeholders was on the need for 
regulatory supervision and correcting the problem of professional transgressions. 
At the same time, the Government appealed to the public to “respect medicine, and respect 
medical professionals” (State Council, 2009). The Supreme People’s Court (2014) followed suit, 
declaring that: “Illegal acts and crimes against medical professionals shall be severely 
punished… Offenders who intentionally kill or injure any medical professional… shall be 
convicted and punished.” This stance of admonishing patients for vilifying physicians was also 
adopted by the media: “a society that disrespects doctors is a barbaric, pathetic, and hopeless 
one” and harming doctors “is a societal shame” (People’s Daily, Dec 21, 2006). The Guangming 
Daily, similarly, underscored “the importance and urgency of building a harmonious 
doctor-patient relationship” (Dec 23, 2005). 
Nevertheless, patients continued to express their frustration and anger: “It seems that 
physicians are not following the Government’s regulation in their daily work. Their persistent 
overprescribing really pisses us off” (ID49). Moreover, the “dependence” of patients upon 





























































physicians led to feelings of helplessness: “They are the professionals, and we have no other 
choice but to rely on their treatment” (ID60). “Patients can hardly choose medical services 
overseas because when illness arrives, they need medical attention immediately; and most of 
them just cannot afford overseas treatment” (ID27). Not only did patients feel unable to find 
alternative sources of care, their expectations of how they should be treated were no longer being 
met. Surveys showed that patients typically expect 15–30 minutes of consultation time but over 
two thirds received less than 10 minutes (Wu et al., 2014; see also Chinese Hospital Association, 
2014). They felt rushed through the system—in part because the daily number of patients seen by 
a physician rose from 5.5 in 1990 to 7.3 in 2015 (Health Yearbooks). These unmet expectations 
fueled dissatisfaction—“a deep reason for the violence against physicians is… [patients] wait in 
a queue for 30 minutes, but only get a three-minute consultation” (People’s Daily, July 24, 
2015). 
The frustration of dependence was further exacerbated by the belief that physicians were 
violating profound societal values. Once the attribution of blame was clearly placed upon the 
profession the moral aspect flared and became prominent. An elderly patient commented, “the 
medical profession is believed to uphold the bottom line of a well-ordered society. If the medical 
profession renounces social justice and morality, society would be on the verge of collapse” 
(ID54). This sentiment was echoed by President Xi, who proclaimed that the medical profession 
represents the “core values of socialism” (Xinhua Net, Aug 20, 2016)—hence, failure to live up 
to this representation was highly consequential. This expectation weighed on the physicians: 
The Chinese Communist Party and Maoism have always regarded health care as an important 
political mission… Health care is an achievement of the socialist movement and represents the 
true nature of the Party… If physicians betray this socialist expectation, they would readily 
induce public grievances. (ID02) 
Highlighting this societal purpose unintentionally “fueled expressions of anger and aggression” 





























































(ID36). Patients candidly stated that: “The Government’s re-emphasis on the medical 
profession’s social welfare role reminds us of what physicians should live up to and what they 
used to mean to the people—and, by contrast, how degenerate they have become” (ID66). 
Despite the worsening relations with patients, physicians exhibited an increasingly 
disillusioned tolerance. Professional associations made few attempts to defend the profession 
other than by occasionally making public calls for respect. As the People’s Daily (Sept 20, 2010) 
remarked, “There are professional associations in health care but their functions are very 
limited… They do not have the right to enforce regulations.” Similarly, as a president of a 
regional branch of the professional association despairingly complained: 
The associations and their websites might seem fancy and classy (gao da shang), but in fact 
their statements are just fake and empty (jia da kong)… When the profession is in crisis, the 
associations have to align themselves with the Government, and so, provide little support to the 
profession or the patients. (ID08) 
A few individuals, however, have attempted to alter public perceptions by highlighting on 
social media the positive aspects of physicians.6 These efforts are mostly scattered and have had 
limited effects—as one patient pointed out: “there might be a few good physicians, but you 
rarely meet them in real life. You cannot extinguish a fire with a cup of water” (ID65). For the 
most part, therefore, the behavior of physicians “confirmed, if not further encouraged, public 
disapproval” (ID04). 
Epilogue
At the end of our research, it was clear that over the course of three decades, there had been 
a significant move away from the collective approval of the medical profession. However, 
whether there will be further movement along the continuum towards stigmatization remains to 
6 A prominent example was Dr. Yu Ying, a surgeon in the prestigious Peking Union Hospital, who opened her 
Weibo (comparable to Twitter) in 2011 and within three years had more than three million followers. By 2014, 
there were about 4,000 Weibo accounts registered by physicians, but few drew much attention (Zhao, 2016). 





























































be seen. Indeed, the current COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 has seemingly given the medical 
profession some temporary respite from stigmatization—as the SARS outbreak did in the early 
2000s. In the early months of the Wuhan outbreak, both the Government and the media widely 
praised medical professionals who came from outside the city to volunteer on the front lines. 
These “heroes” were lauded by the media for “disregarding compensation and death, and for not 
shying away from danger or fear… Salute to the ‘warriors in white’!” (People’s Daily, Feb 2, 
2020). As the outbreak spread, the media continued to praise medical professionals for 
“safeguarding the safety and health of the people with the highest sense of mission” (Xinhua Net, 
Mar 5, 2020). On May 21, 2020, attendees of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference stood in silence for one minute to recognize the sacrifice of 
medical professionals in the fight against the pandemic. Through such public acclamations, the 
Government has helped push for a restoration of the public’s respect for the profession. 
At the same time, the Government has continued its efforts to curb abuse and violence 
against the medical profession by assigning harsher penalties (including death sentences) to 
perpetrators. Yet, despite these efforts, incidents of abuse and violence have remained high. In 
2018, the Chinese Medical Doctor Association reported that 66% of physicians experienced 
verbal abuse or physical violence—down only 7% from 2015. Moreover, reports of aggressive 
behavior towards physicians have remained commonplace. Strikingly, the public’s reaction to a 
recent incident where the son of a 95-year-old stroke victim fatally stabbed a physician in the 
neck on Christmas Eve in 2019 was mixed—with some reactions echoing our earlier fieldwork. 
Of the first 100 online comments on this incident, a majority suggested that such acts of violence 
were a “normal” response to “unethical physicians” and the “systemic problem within the 
profession”: “We should put a bullet in the heads of corrupt physicians, upholding the 





























































professional ethics”; “the key to solving worsening doctor-patient relationships is to let patients 
be able to afford health care and stop physicians from getting bribes and kickbacks” 
(Toutiao.com, Dec 29, 2020). 
In sum, it appears that the process of stigmatization remains unsettled and is still unfolding. 
In particular, it remains partial as stigmatization is targeted on the ethical dimension of 
professional behavior as opposed to the profession’s expertise or competence. Moreover, 
disagreement remains among stakeholders regarding the appropriate response and stance toward 
the profession. Indeed, there has even been a modest shift “back” towards ambivalence following 
the Government’s continued efforts to contain and reverse stigmatization—and the temporary 
respite provided by the COVID-19 pandemic. Whether this reversal or containment will hold 
over the longer term or not remains to be seen, as patients continue to harbor misgivings and 
anger towards medical professionals. The stigmatization of the medical profession has not, in 
other words, “stabilized” (Mair, Wolf, & Seelos, 2016). 
DISCUSSION
Despite growing interest among management and organizational scholars in uncovering 
how organizations manage the consequences of being stigmatized, there is still much to learn 
about the processes by which stigmatization emerges and unfolds. Our primary contribution is 
the development of a process model of professional stigmatization—which theorizes the role of 
different stakeholders, and the dynamics and mechanisms implicated in the fall from grace of a 
respected profession. Our secondary contribution offers insights into stigmatization processes 
more broadly. Drawing upon our case study, we point to three complexities that need to be taken 
into account in future research and theorizing. 
A Process Model of Professional Stigmatization
As illustrated in Figure 3, the model of professional stigmatization that we derive from our 





























































case study highlights the various dynamics and mechanisms that precipitate and then amplify the 
initial move away from collective approval towards ambivalence, followed by catalyzing 
dynamics that escalate even further the momentum towards stigmatization. That momentum may 
become increasingly “self-sustaining” (Devers et al., 2009) and difficult, albeit not impossible, to 
contain. Intriguingly, however, even though secondary and primary stakeholders may 
collectively label a profession as acting improperly, they may diverge in prescriptions of 
appropriate punishment because of their respective relationships with the profession. Our model 
proposes that primary stakeholders will be harsher in their judgments; and, that secondary 
stakeholders—particularly those responsible for governing the profession—may engage in 
countermoves or efforts to disturb or reverse the movement towards stigmatization (as illustrated 
by the dotted lines and arrows in Figure 3). Because of their social prestige, professions are often 
subject to the scrutiny of multiple stakeholders—suggesting that professional stigmatization is 
rarely a linear, unidirectional process, but an ongoing and oscillating one. Below we detail the 
precipitating, amplifying and catalyzing dynamics that are implicated. 
--------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 3 about here
--------------------------------------------------
Precipitating dynamics. Unlike prior studies that point to ethical breaches as the starting 
point of a move towards stigmatization (Devers et al., 2008; Hudson, 2008; Wiesenfeld et al., 
2008), ethical transgressions alone had little effect on the widespread social approval of the 
Chinese medical profession. One possible explanation is that society is more tolerant of 
professions because their social status counteracts such negative reactions (Ashforth & Kreiner, 
1999; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). That the unethical behaviors in our case continued for over a 
decade without precipitating loss of approval strengthens the possibility that misconducts alone 





























































need not trigger the process towards professional stigmatization. 
Instead, for social approval to be undermined, it seems that unethical behaviors need to 
inflict visible “damage” upon primary stakeholders. In our case, the stigmatization process was 
touched off by a change in the health insurance scheme that had adverse financial implications 
for patients. The importance of damage is underlined by the fact that the transgressions were no 
different after the introduction of the insurance changes from those of the previous decade when 
minimal patient backlash had occurred. Moreover, government surveys showed that medical 
treatments had even improved slightly in terms of the percentage of patients who were 
successfully treated. Thus, our case suggests that it is the combination of pervasive 
transgressions and damage to primary stakeholders (i.e., patients or clients) that precipitates the 
shift from collective approval towards ambivalence. 
Amplifying dynamics. Once initiated, the momentum towards ambivalence is fueled by a 
“spiral of voice.” Secondary stakeholders (e.g., the media) generate awareness and legitimation 
of the negative stances and reactions of primary stakeholders, and, in doing so, further their 
diffusion. As those affected learn of how others are expressing their dissatisfaction, they, too, 
feel justified in adopting and expressing a similar form of disapproval. There occurs, in this 
respect, the opposite to Clemente and Roulet’s (2014) “spiral of silence”—i.e., that those holding 
a minority view increasingly become and remain silent. In our case, the media’s sympathetic 
reporting of incidents of abuse towards physicians gave credence to the view that “voice” 
(Hirschman, 1977)—in the form of disputes and abuse—was acceptable and appropriate, thus 
triggering further incidents. 
Such a pattern is in line with the standard depiction of mimetic diffusion, which argues that 
as ideas and practices diffuse they gain social legitimacy and become accepted as the normal and 





























































appropriate practice—to the point where they are adopted uncritically (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2017; Deephouse et al., 2017). In a professional context, however, where primary stakeholders 
rely on the technical competence of the professional but lack the expertise to appraise whether 
that competence is being appropriately deployed, this “need” for the legitimating evaluations of 
others may be especially high. 
Before turning to the move from ambivalence towards stigmatization, it is worth noting an 
unusual feature of our case: “strained tolerance”—i.e., the absence of any systematic pushback 
by the profession (as illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 3). As criticisms and reporting of 
ethical transgressions grew, some physicians chose to leave the profession, others sought to fight 
back (albeit unsuccessfully), but most became disillusioned. Together, these responses 
unwittingly condoned or tolerated further transgressions, as unethical behavior appeared to be 
acceptable. The geographically distributed nature of professions, we suggest, may be one reason 
why professionals may not be able to easily and collectively defend themselves. But this 
difficulty of providing a defense is particularly acute if a profession lacks an effective collective 
voice—as in China, where the professional association was established only after the 
transgressions had noticeably begun to spread, and even later, it lacked the autonomy and 
authority to suppress ethical transgressions and/or counter the narrative in the media. 
Catalyzing dynamics: towards collective labeling. Prior studies suggest that severe and 
protracted transgressions by professionals, once publicly disclosed, will prompt repair efforts by 
regulators and governments. Herepath and Kitchener’s (2016: 1133) study of the English NHS, 
for example, details how the government stepped in to effect institutional repair by explicitly 
highlighting the harm inflicted by severe breaches to professional codes of conduct. The 
intention was to prompt professionals to self-monitor and self-regulate. In our case, the 





























































Government employed a similar strategy of rendering an authoritative judgment and of public 
shaming in the attempt to “suppress transgressive behavior and restore normative conformity” 
(Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, & Smith-Crowe, 2014: 280; see also Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009). 
Importantly, however, the Government unintendedly shifted the debate from an emphasis upon 
the transgressions of individual professionals to placing responsibility upon the profession. This 
broadening of the target of stigma contrasts with prior models that depict a narrowing of the 
target—such as the shift from stigmatizing an organization to stigmatizing its leadership 
(Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Our case suggests that when transgressions within a profession become 
pervasive and generalized by an authoritative stakeholder, the targets of stigmatization might 
move to a broader category as opposed to individual scapegoats. 
In other words, our model suggests that the judgments rendered by authoritative 
stakeholders can severely breach the shield of social respect that surrounds a profession (Brint, 
1994). Further, once rendered, such judgments may escalate the momentum towards 
stigmatization by catalyzing collective labeling by primary and secondary stakeholders. In our 
case, both the media and patients adopted the authoritative stakeholder’s stance—and even used 
similar language. This suggests that, when an authoritative stakeholder proclaims and attributes a 
judgment of blame, other stakeholders may follow suit—triggering a chorus of criticism that 
quickens the move from ambivalence towards stigmatization. 
Catalyzing dynamics: towards divergent punishments. The momentum unleashed by an 
authoritative judgment moves the evaluations of primary and secondary stakeholders towards 
stigmatization. But, interestingly, instead of converging upon an “appropriate” punishment—as 
prior models would suggest (e.g., Devers et al., 2009; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008)—stakeholders 
may prescribe divergent forms of punishment. In our case, the Government and the media 





























































resorted to shaming and called for greater regulatory supervision, whereas patients called for 
much harsher punishments—even supporting violence. This divergence supports Helms et al.’s 
(2019) contention that stigmatization may elicit different reactions from heterogeneous 
audiences. In professional contexts, this divergence in punishments, particularly the harsher 
punishments prescribed by primary stakeholders, can be attributed to two characteristic features 
of professions. 
First, there is typically a strong dependence of primary stakeholders upon the profession. 
This dependence runs counter to most portrayals of stigmatization situations which implicitly 
assume that “exit” (Hirschman, 1977) is an option—i.e., that those affected can “shun” (Adut, 
2008; Hampel & Tracey, 2017) or limit relationships with the stigmatized (Devers et al., 2009; 
Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Such shunning and bypassing are means by which stakeholders can 
escape from or exit their relationship of dependence. However, these options may not be feasible 
in the case of professions. Primary stakeholders may be unable to withdraw from relationships 
with a profession—in effect, they are in situations of “impotent dependence,” which acutely 
matters especially in professions such as medicine and law. If that dependence is abused, it will 
inflame strong emotions of “resentment and a desire to restore justice” (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008: 
239)—and, as in our case, precipitate harsh penalties. 
The second feature of professions that can prompt harsh penalties is the high expectation of 
moral behavior. If a profession is evaluated as morally corrupt, the sheer discrepancy between its 
actual social identity (i.e., what it is) and its virtual identity (i.e., what it is expected to be) will 
antagonize stakeholders, and prompt a more aggressive response—especially towards 
professions that more fundamentally reflect societal norms, as in the Chinese context where the 
medical profession is perceived as an exemplar of state socialism—rooted in, and reflective of, 





























































the deeply institutionalized value of “serving the people” (Davis, 2000; Sidel & Sidel, 1973). 
The underlying implication is that professions that have high “moral resonance” are held to 
higher expectations, such that betrayals of those expectations can incite acts of emotional 
retribution and more aggressive punishments than might be applied to other professions. These 
two mechanisms highlight an important aspect of the process by which a profession moves 
towards stigmatization. While ethical transgressions often trigger emotional responses (Pollock 
et al., 2019), such responses in the professional context may be heightened by the personal and 
dependent relationship of the primary stakeholder upon the profession. Further, if the ethical 
transgressions violate fundamental societal values—i.e., if the moral resonance is particularly 
high—then responses will be harsh and even rise to the level of physical violence. 
Pulling the above together, the model we propose shows that the stigmatization of a 
profession is an ongoing process, which may not unfold in a linear or consistent manner. 
Because stakeholders have different experiences and relationships with professions, their 
responses and roles in the stigmatization process will likely vary. Moreover, both the stigmatized 
professionals and authoritative stakeholders may engage in countermoves to contain or reverse 
the stigmatization process. In our case, the Government admonished both patients and the 
medical profession—implementing stricter regulations and punishments for violence and ethical 
transgressions. These efforts resulted in a modest shift back towards ambivalence, suggesting 
that countermoves may disturb the momentum towards stigmatization. 
Unfolding events also influence the move and momentum towards stigmatization. In our 
case, SARS and the COVID-19 pandemic altered the context of the stigmatization process. Such 
events illustrate how external changes can shift the way stakeholder groups portray and perceive 
a profession—and offer opportunities for stakeholders to promote their particular stance. The 





























































process of stigmatization, in other words, is an ongoing and possibly oscillating process—shaped 
by the actions and countermoves of different stakeholders within the context of societal events. 
The Stigmatization Process
Our theorization depicts professional stigmatization as an inherently complex process. This 
depiction, we propose, is relevant to processes of stigmatization more generally. Stigmatization 
processes are complex because (a) they may be partial in their focus upon certain aspects of 
organizational or professional behavior; (b) they involve multiple stakeholders suggesting the 
potential for an ongoing struggle between competing perspectives; and (c) the movement 
towards or from stigmatization, and the pace of that movement, may be affected by the actions 
(or inaction) and countermoves of stakeholders as they respond to unfolding events. 
In referring to the partial nature of stigma, our study is consistent with Helms et al. (2019) 
who advocate that audiences may stigmatize particular aspects of an organization’s practices, yet 
still perceive the organization as legitimate. As Hampel and Tracey (2019) put it, stigmatization 
is not a “binary” evaluation. Our study empirically confirms and elaborates this theoretical 
position by raising an important implication—namely, that the focus of stigmatization will shape 
the particular mechanisms involved and the particular punishment that follows. For example, in 
our case, moral resonance may not have been triggered by breaches arising from incompetence. 
Likewise, the punishment for incompetence might not have been violence, but shunning and 
professional devaluation (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). For a more complete understanding of the 
stigmatization process, it is important to consider the focus (or roots) of stigmatization. 
To further develop understanding of the stigmatization process also requires giving 
attention to the range of stakeholders involved. Most studies of stigma have attended to a small 
number of stakeholder groups—often, only the media (exceptions include Helms & Patterson, 
2014; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). Yet, our study demonstrates that not only are multiple 





























































stakeholders often involved, but they play different roles in the process. It follows, then, that the 
relationships between the target of stigmatization and each stakeholder group should be 
examined; in addition to the relationships between the different stakeholders. Although 
stakeholders may “pile on” each other’s judgments and converge into a “consensus” at a 
particular time (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008; Devers et al., 2009), they may just as easily diverge in 
their views. In our study, public shaming by an authoritative stakeholder unwittingly created a 
general target and propelled collective labeling by both primary and secondary stakeholders. But, 
whereas primary stakeholders persisted in advocating aggressive punishment of the 
professionals, secondary stakeholders began to urgently call for restraint. An appreciation of the 
potentially wider range of stakeholders involved may implicate a less convergent or linear 
process than is often portrayed (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008; Devers et al., 2009). In other words, 
including a range of stakeholders may provide a more nuanced understanding of how and why 
stigmatization is expressed in particular ways, and the varied responses of those stigmatized. 
Moreover, our case shows that the relationships between stakeholders shape the direction 
and pace of stigmatizing momentum. If stakeholders are in agreement, then momentum can 
become “self-sustaining” and difficult to contain or reverse (Devers et al., 2009)—especially 
following the expression of an authoritative judgment. However, if stakeholders differ in their 
positions and their respective actions (or inaction), such an authoritative judgment may 
undermine the momentum—slowing, containing, and perhaps even reversing the movement 
towards stigmatization. Stigmatization, in other words, may be an oscillating rather than a 
unidirectional process. Hence, instead of assuming that stigmatization is “complete” when a 
particular stakeholder defines a pattern of behavior as warranting social disapproval, or 
concluding that stigma is eliminated when disapproval is temporarily silenced, it would be more 





























































appropriate to adopt a more historical and longitudinal approach that acknowledges the various 
complexities of the stigmatization process. 
Future Research
Given that ours is an extreme case, further work is needed to confirm and develop the 
insights that the case provides. As our primary interest concerns the stigmatization of 
professions, we propose two promising directions for future research that are especially relevant 
for that context—although they would also inform studies of stigmatization more broadly. 
Containing Stigmatization. An intriguing and important stream of future research is how 
the process of stigmatization can actually be contained or even reversed—and by whom. Prior 
research suggests that professions attempt to contain and repress early intimations of nascent 
stigmatization (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Gabbioneta, Greenwood, Mazzola, & Minoja, 2013; 
Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Yet, in our case there was little such action or effort to do so. One 
reason was the late formation of a professional association that could represent and guide the 
profession. But more importantly, being newly established and under the direct supervision of 
the Government, the professional associations in China had neither the capacity nor the authority 
to redress ethical transgressions. Future research, therefore, is needed to explore whether a more 
active professional association could contain the move towards stigmatization; and perhaps even 
reverse that process. 
However, even in Western countries, including the UK, Australia and Canada, professional 
associations have shown relative weakness in addressing pervasive transgressions (Leslie et al., 
2018; Marriage, 2019). In the UK, for example, the General Medical Council, established in 
1858, consistently failed to prevent transgressions—to the point that the collegial model of 
professional self-regulation was abandoned in the 1990s (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011). Similarly, 
the accounting profession in the U.S. and the UK has been chastised for its weak control of 





























































audits, leading to new regulatory arrangements (e.g., Eley & Kinder, 2019). Even so, it is 
important to uncover whether, and under what conditions associations might influence the 
process towards stigmatization. Comparisons across countries would be especially informative 
about the generalizability of our model. A related line of research could inquire whether, and in 
what contexts, other actors—prestigious professional firms, judges, media celebrities, political 
parties, and the Church—might have sufficient “discursive legitimacy” (Phillips, Lawrence, & 
Hardy, 2004) to influence the momentum towards stigmatization. 
A complementary line of research could explore the means by which the process might be 
contained and reversed. The public shaming in our case underlined that the profession is to 
blame, and unwittingly created a general target for escalating disapproval. But what if a strategy 
other than public shaming is adopted? Would the simple removal of the specific causes of the 
“damage” to primary stakeholders (in our case, funding and incentive systems) enable the 
resumption of respect for the profession? Our suspicion is that restoring social respect would not 
be that easy. Alternatively, would strict punishment of patients who violently attack physicians 
reverse the process? Again, our case suggests that it would not be that easy. The Government 
recently introduced regulations against physical violence in hospitals, but threats and verbal 
abuse remain pervasive and physical violence still occurs. Future research into how the 
momentum of stigmatization of a profession might be slowed or even reversed is clearly needed. 
Another promising line of research would be to explore whether the timing of interventions 
affects the process of stigma containment and reversal. In our case, the Government began to 
police the profession only after ethical transgressions had become pervasive, which raises the 
question of whether earlier entries might have more influence? And, would the restoration of 
professional respect be more likely during and after a health crisis, which seemed to occur during 





























































the 2002–2003 SARS epidemic and is now occurring during the current COVID-19 pandemic? 
While a crisis could immediately highlight the importance and devotion of medical professionals, 
the evidence from the SARS epidemic is that the respite from stigmatization may be short-lived. 
Whether the current COVID-19 pandemic becomes an opportunity for the Government and the 
profession to restore moral approval is of immediate interest—and provides a timely opportunity 
for scholars and policymakers to explore important aspects of stigma containment. 
Rendering Violence: A Moral Imperative? The second direction for future research we 
propose pertains to the role of moral resonance and its association with prescriptions of violence. 
Ours is a rare empirical study that shows widespread physical violence towards professionals for 
their failure to meet the moral expectations of primary stakeholders. This pattern of behavior is, 
in a sense, an emotionally driven moral equivalent to Zuckerman’s (1999) “categorical 
imperative.” The categorical imperative focuses upon the consequences of failing to align with 
the cognitive framework of stakeholders. If securities analysts (in Zuckerman’s case) do not 
comprehend an organization because it does not fit their prevailing classification of 
organizations, they will not review the organization—leading to adverse financial consequences 
for that organization. Our case, in contrast, suggests that adverse consequences follow from 
failing to align with the moral expectations of stakeholders. Further, whereas violations of a 
categorical imperative prompt rational and calculative penalties (i.e., an “illegitimacy discount”), 
violations of a moral imperative evoke acute emotions of repugnance and anger, prompting 
aggressive reactions. 
The moral imperative, we suggest, is particularly relevant to professions because of their 
presumed commitment to an ethical code and claim to a particular expertise. But the moral 
imperative may apply more notably to some professions than others—specifically, to those that 





























































embody core societal values and thus whose actions have a particularly high “moral resonance.” 
Future research should compare the moral resonance of different professions within the same 
societal context, and observe the particular punishments applied. 
Further, since the particular professions associated with fundamental societal norms may 
vary across contexts and over time (Hampel & Tracey, 2017), it would be especially interesting 
to compare the risks of moral resonance faced by different professions in particular countries. 
Candidates for attention include the legal profession, which in many Western countries 
symbolizes the rule of law and thus is expected to occupy the moral high ground (Smets et al., 
2012). Others would be the Catholic Church, because of the widely exposed sexual abuse of 
minors by priests (Gutierrez, Howard-Grenville, & Scully, 2010; Palmer & Feldman, 2018), and 
politicians, whose actions have been the fuse of riots and upheaval (Obrador & Uhlmann, 2018). 
Such comparisons could probe not only whether particular professions are held to a higher code 
of moral resonance but also whether the punishments associated with moral resonance are the 
same across countries. 
CONCLUSION
The stigmatization of professions is an important and growing problem. Given that the 
growing incidence of violence against physicians has occurred “across the globe” (World 
Medical Association, 2015), and that the decline of confidence in professions could have serious 
implications not only for those directly affected but also for social stability, the need for 
understanding professional stigmatization is compelling. It is, in this respect, a disquietingly 
neglected “grand challenge” that warrants further attention (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & 
Tihanyi, 2016). Our hope is that the analysis and model provided in this paper will inform and 
inspire future work in this critically important area.
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Figure 1: Media Depiction of Professional Ethics, by Year
Figure 2: Number of Reports of Disputes between Physicians and Patients, by Year





























































Figure 3: A Process Model of Professional Stigmatization





























































Table 1: Media Coding and Illustrations 
Codes Definitions Illustrations
Positive The article praises medical 
professionals by reporting on 
public approval, highlighting 
ethical merits, or generally 
presenting supportive 
viewpoints of professional 
ethics. 
“The medical professionals wash clothes for critically ill patients, give them haircuts, and bath them…so that the 
patients feel like they are at home. The medical staff strongly adheres to professional ethics, insist that they do not 
let patients buy them meals or receive gifts from patients. Their excellent service has won praise from the people.” 
(Oct 11, 1992)
“All medical staff in the hospital has unified their thoughts, consciously fulfilling their promises…everyone 
serves patients with superb medical skills and noble medical ethics… The patient is delighted to find the feeling 
of ‘God’, and the medical staff has more clearly defined the responsibility of the ‘angels’.” (Aug 12, 1998)
“The documents and the pennants record the flashing footprints of these physicians’ exquisite medical skills and 
noble medical ethics serving the people… Those ‘accessible’ expert clinics are implemented to help the people in 
the poor areas in the western region.” (Jan10, 2008)
Neutral The article either reports on 
ethics-related facts that do not 
have immediate connotations 
or offers an impartial 
perspective of professional 
ethics. 
“Medical supervisors have the right to supervise medical charges, drug prices, medical service quality and 
professional ethics. Among the first group of supervisors are provincial governmental officials, journalists, 
representatives of health-related industries, as well as retired cadres.” (Sept 19, 1989)
“We should actively promote the construction of medical ethics and deepen the education of the socialist concept 
of honor and disgrace, making the medical professionals abide by the purpose of service, enhance service 
awareness, improve service quality, and maintain a good professional image.” (Oct 25, 2006)
“Our country is implementing a revised assessment of physicians…physicians will be regularly evaluated every 
two years, including the assessment of professional skills, work performance and professional ethics. Whoever 
fails in any of the three items will not pass the evaluation and will be disqualified. For those who are disqualified, 
they must be suspended from practicing.” (Mar 4, 2013)
Negative The article criticizes medical 
professionals by reporting on 
public opposition, discussing 
ethical transgressions, or 
generally presenting critical 
viewpoints of professional 
ethics. 
“Some medical professionals solicit and accept bribes and kickbacks…causing economic losses for the State 
taxes, enterprises, and patients; and, seriously violates the basic medical principles. These bad phenomena occur 
in some hospitals and medical professionals. But this severely tainted the image of ‘angels in white’…People hate 
these serious violations of professional ethics.” (Oct 4, 1994)
“This is a typical illegal case that seriously harms the interests of the people… This has not only exposed the 
hospitals’ impulse to seek profit, but also the chaos in hospital management… The ‘warriors in white’ here, 
however, are intentionally wasting medical resources, violating fundamental professional ethics, and also 
trampling on the dignity of medicine.” (May 11, 2006)
“Where is physicians’ professional pride? If we read people’s comments, physicians are seen as ‘wolves in white’ 
and ‘vampires’. Physicians are not treating patients well… and are prescribing drugs only to make more money. 
As the doctor-patient relationship worsens, professional pride has substantially diminished.” (Sept 26, 2014)





























































Table 2: Core Concepts, Data Sources and Illustrations
Core Concepts Data Sources Data Illustrations
Media articles  “The issue in the purchase and sale of medications has been around for a long time, dating back to 1984 
and 1985… The system of financing hospitals by overprescribing drugs is an important reason… 60% to 
70% of hospital revenues come from selling drugs.” (PD, Sept 20, 1995)
 “Many hospitals blindly pursue economic interests, treating patients as ‘cash cows’ by overprescribing and 
discretionary charges.” (PD, Nov 2, 2006)
Interviews  “I always try to see a doctor who I know if I am sick. Or I would almost always end up being 
overprescribed drugs and examinations.” (ID28)
 “All physicians have to make money for their hospitals, which typically have an in-house compensation 






Published statistics  Annual growth of prescribed drug expenses (MOH)
Archival documents  “The difficulty and high expense of health care has become a significant issue… 48.9% of the people do 
not pursue medical attention when they are ill…” (MOH, 2005)
Media articles  “When patients visit doctors, their expenses are high—the prescribed drugs are expensive, hospital fees 
are high…” (GD, May 25, 2001)
 “Over the years, unreasonable medical expenses have continued to grow, while the [financial] burden on 
the people has continued to increase. The problems of inaccessible and costly medical services are very 
prominent…to which the people have reacted strongly” (PD, Apr 10, 2004)
Interviews  “Nothing could have beaten free-of-charge health services; patients would not complain about it as long as 




Published statistics  Annual growth of non-reimbursable health expenses (MOH)
Media articles  “The media should reduce their sensational coverage of incidents of patients confronting doctors so that 
the ‘broken window effect’—imitation by more people—can be prevented.” (GD, July 27, 2012)
Interviews  “The media reported so many violent incidents against doctors but not enough on how those who 
committed violence were, or might be, punished. Their reports did not mitigate the violence, but actually 
led to imitation… Now violence has become the intuitive response for unhappy patients.” (ID03)
 “Patients might not have thought about making a fuss, but the newspapers seemed to tell them what they 
could do—that is, vilifying doctors.” (ID12)
 “The media were informing patients that they could resort to disputes, spreading such an idea that 
physicians deserved such confrontation.” (ID22)
Spiral of voice
Published statistics  More than 70% of physicians attributed violence to the media’s biased reporting (CHA, 2014)





























































Archival documents  Professional associations were banned until the Medical Practitioners Act 1999. (National People’s 
Congress, 1999)
Media articles  “Compared to bribes and kickbacks, the acquiescence and indifference to bribes and kickbacks is even 




Interviews  “The medical profession in our country is regulated by the state. It has no professional autonomy like in 
some Western countries. If individual physicians tried to stand up against the hidden rules, they would be 
fired or at least sidelined by the hospital presidents or their department heads.” (ID07)
 “The professional associations have made minimal impact on our daily practices. I mean they are not 
directly supervising physicians.” (ID21)
 “I have met good physicians, but I don’t know anyone who openly criticizes overprescribing.” (ID51)
Archival documents  “Medical professionals must not hurt people’s interests or adopt unjust means in order to pursue 
self-interest… Those unethical and illegal practices must be opposed.” (MOH, 2005)
 “Must strengthen the public welfare function of public hospitals, strengthen medical professional ethics… 
and correct the tendency of revenue generation.” (State Council, 2006)
Media articles  “The Party has passed policies to reform the management of public health institutes… such that the 
tendency of blindly seeking profit should be prohibited.” (PD, Nov 23, 2006)
Authoritative 
judgments
Interviews  “Things became different once the Government got involved. For more than a decade, it had been 
supportive of market-oriented practices. But now, it made a public statement setting the tone that 
physicians’ market-oriented behaviors should be criticized.” (ID09)
 “The governmental statements meant something! It was not like some nobody judging the unethical 
physicians. It was the Government. They publicly and explicitly criticized the medical profession. It 
changed the public attitude towards physicians.” (ID07)
Archival documents  “The significant doctor-patient contradiction… is due to prescription mark-ups… and revenue generation 
among hospitals and physicians.” (MOH, 2006)
Media articles  “The ‘angels in white’ has already become a shameful occupation.” (PD, Sept 14, 2006)
 “Physicians are collectively stigmatized and ‘demonized’ by the media and the general public, becoming 






Interviews  “It is not just one patient or one newspaper that blames physicians. It is a great number of patients and 
media that together vilify physicians. Oftentimes I feel that the disputes are against all physicians.” (ID11)
 “There was no consensus among the media and the general public before the Government blamed the 




Archival documents  “The general public shall respect physicians, constructing a nice atmosphere of respecting medicine in the 
society… improve the professional environment for physicians.” (State Council, 2009)
 “The rights of medical professionals shall be protected… Anyone who interferes with the work and life of 





























































medical professionals shall bear legal responsibility.” (State Council, 2010)
Media articles  “Violence should be prohibited in hospitals, and medical professionals protected… The whole of society 
should not tolerate violence at all.” (GD, Oct 30, 2013)
Interviews  “Though the media followed the Government discouraging disputes and violence, it was no longer 
effective. Patients continue to resort to disputes and sometimes violence.” (ID16)
secondary 
stakeholders
Published statistics  Growth of doctor-patient disputes and violence in hospitals (CMDA, 2015)
Archival documents  “A major explanation for the violence against physicians is because patients are incapable of grasping the 
professional expertise of medicine… And they believe that physicians are accountable for their illness and 
pain.” (CHA, 2014)
Media articles  “Patients are disadvantaged, which requires medical professionals to have a higher moral standard… 





Interviews  “In the doctor-patient relationship, patients are powerless. They can only rely on us [physicians] to tell 
them what to do.” (ID05)
 “Physicians are different from businessmen, and hospitals are neither a free nor an equal market because 
patients cannot choose what to buy. When they go to a doctor, they are disadvantageous and powerless.” 
(ID14)
 “Patients are stuck with doctors. Whichever hospitals they visit, they could encounter a doctor who 
overprescribes… because those practices can be found everywhere.” (ID20)
Archival documents  “Health care is relevant to billions of people, a major societal issue… and a major mission of constructing 
a socialist harmonious society.” (State Council, 2009)
Media articles  “In the mind of any Chinese person, hospitals have always been ‘the medical work units for socialist 
public welfare and social benefits.’ This concept has been so deeply rooted in people’s minds that no one 




Interviews  “Health care used to be an essential part of social welfare. Doctors had been and still are expected to 
devote themselves to serving the people.” (ID04)
 “To many people, the medical profession represents the ‘conscience’ of the society. When the profession 
becomes tainted, people may feel hopeless.” (ID10)
 “The fall of the medical profession symbolized the collapse of old socialist norms. Physicians are not 
bankers. When physicians failed, the institutions also failed.” (ID35)
Abbreviations: Chinese Hospital Association (CHA); Chinese Medical Doctor Association (CMDA); 
Ministry of Health (MOH); People’s Daily (PD); Guangming Daily (GD).






























































Milo Shaoqing Wang (swang7@alberta.ca) is a doctoral candidate at the University of Alberta. 
His current research examines the process by which organizations strategically translate and 
transplant contested practices into an alien environment where the practices challenge existing 
institutions. He is interested in the intersection of social evaluation, strategic management, and 
institutional theory.
Mia Raynard (mia.raynard@wu.ac.at) is an assistant professor of organizational change in the 
Management Department at Vienna University of Economics and Business. Her research 
examines processes of change that unfold at the organization and field levels, and responses to 
conflicting pressures for change and stability. Her recent work focuses on emerging markets, 
professions, and CSR and sustainability.
Royston Greenwood (royston.greenwood@ualberta.ca) is Professor Emeritus at the University 
of Alberta, and Professorial Fellow at the University of Edinburgh Business School. He received 
his PhD from the University of Birmingham in the UK. He is a Fellow of the Academy of 
Management and an Honorary Member of the European Group for Organization Studies 
(EGOS). His current work focuses upon the application of institutional analysis to social 
issues—such as corruption and wrongdoing—in professional contexts.
Page 61 of 61 Academy of Management Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
